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DOCTORS’ THINKING ABOUT ‘THE SYSTEM’ AS A THREAT TO 
PATIENT SAFETY  
 
Abstract 
 
‘Systems thinking’ is an important feature of the emerging ‘patient safety’ agenda. As 
a key component of a ‘safety culture’, it encourages clinicians to look past individual 
error to recognise the latent factors that threaten safety. This paper investigates 
whether current medical thinking is commensurate with the idea of ‘systems thinking’ 
together with its implications for policy. The findings are based on qualitative semi-
structured interviews with specialist physicians working within one NHS District 
General Hospital in the English Midlands. It is shown that, rather then favouring a 
‘person-centred’ perspective, doctors readily identify ‘the system’ as a threat to 
patient safety. This is not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing safety discourse or 
knowledge of policy, but reflects a tacit understanding of how services are 
(dis)organised. This line of thinking serves to mitigate individual wrong-doing and 
protect professional credibility by encouraging doctors to accept and accommodate 
the shortcomings of the system, rather than participate in new forms of organisational 
learning.  
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DOCTORS’ THINKING ABOUT ‘THE SYSTEM’ AS A THREAT TO 
PATIENT SAFETY 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Patient safety’ has emerged as a global health policy priority (World Health 
Organization, 2004). In the US it has been shown that as many as 98000 people die 
every year as a result of clinical error and mistake (Brennan and Leape, 1991). Like 
other health care systems, the National Health Service (NHS) of England and Wales is 
not immune to the risks and errors that threaten the safety of patient care. It has been 
estimated that one in ten hospital patients experience some form of clinical error and 
on an annual basis there could be as many as 850000 of these events, costing the 
health service over £2billion in additional care and claiming up to 40000 lives 
(Department of Health, 2000; Moore, 2000). The policy agenda currently being 
implemented across the NHS aims to enhance the safety of patient care through 
establishing a new logic and approach to organisational learning. Led by the newly 
created National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), this involves the introduction of a 
service-wide National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), which is designed to 
gather information about the threats to safety thereby enabling both local and national 
service leaders to identify the ‘root causes’ of danger and the opportunities for service 
improvement (NPSA, 2003).   
 
What marks out the emerging ‘patient safety’ agenda from previous models of clinical 
risk management and quality improvement is a fundamental re-conceptualisation of 
what constitutes a threat to safety. Drawing from the theories of ergonomics and 
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social psychology, the Human Factors approach suggests that whilst human error is 
inevitable it is also conditioned, enabled and exacerbated by the wider environmental, 
socio-organisational and technical systems within which behaviour is located 
(Reason, 1997; Vincent et al, 1998). A distinction is made between ‘active errors’ at 
the sharp-end of clinical work, and the ‘latent factors’ that can negatively influence 
performance, such as, broken communications, poor team working, mismanagement 
of resources, technological complexity, or a lack of warning systems (Department of 
Health, 2000; Vincent and Reason, 1999). Through gathering information about the 
threats to safety and identifying the relevant ‘upstream’ latent factors the NRLS offers 
to deliver enhanced patient safety (NPSA, 2003) 
 
Despite policies emphasising the role of latent or systemic factors, it has been 
suggested that the professionals, staff and culture of the NHS remain characterised by 
a ‘person-centred’ approach to safety that too readily focuses on individual 
responsibility and wrong-doing (Reason, 2000). This restricts organisational learning, 
not only because it neglects the latent factors that produce error, but more insidiously 
because it fosters a culture of blame where individuals are held responsible and often 
reprimanded for instances of patient harm. The blame culture has major implications 
for organisational learning because it discourages staff from being open about their 
mistakes and reporting information to organisational leaders because of the belief that 
they will be punished by colleagues or other disciplinary procedures. Although there 
are many known barriers to incident reporting, such as the lack of resources, time 
constraints, cultural taboos and collegiality, these cultural issues remaining some of 
the most illusive and difficult to change, especially for medical professionals (Lawton 
and Parker, 2002; Vincent et al., 1999;  Waring, 2005a). 
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It has been argued therefore that a ‘systems approach’, which appreciates the latent 
factors that threaten safety, should be fostered within the NHS to counter the culture 
of blame and encourage incident reporting (Reason, 2000). This is couched within the 
wider objective of cultural change, where the creation of a ‘safety culture’ has been 
designated the first of ‘seven steps to patient safety’ (NPSA, 2003). Within the 
prevailing thinking of ‘safety science’ it has been shown how High Reliability 
Organisations (those organisations with good records of safety) are characterised by a 
strong ‘safety culture’ that underpins organisational learning and error management 
through shaping how employees make sense of safety, encouraging ‘mindfulness’ to 
dangerous situations, determining the relative importance of safety amongst other 
priorities and translating sense-making into communication and learning (Helmreich 
and Merritt, 1998; Weick, 1987, 2002; Reason, 1997).  Accordingly the promotion of 
a ‘safety culture’ within health care, specifically ‘systems thinking’ is fundamental to 
the implementation of the ‘patient safety’ agenda in that it shapes how staff give 
meaning to safety in such a way to overcome the blame culture, and in doing so 
support organisational learning through encouraging staff participation in the NRLS
 
(NPSA, 2003; Reason, 2000; Weick, 2002). 
 
It is far from clear, however, how far the ideas and practices of the patient safety 
reforms, especially ‘system thinking’, have actually penetrated the work and culture 
of frontline clinical staff.  There is little contemporary evidence about how health care 
professionals, specifically medical doctors, think about the threats to patient safety, 
what informs their thinking, and whether indeed doctors favour a ‘person-centred’ 
approach as opposed to a ‘systems approach’. A number of sociological studies have 
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revealed much about ‘what’ doctors see as the errors in their work, ‘how’ they come 
to hold these views, and what ‘consequences’ they have for professional regulation 
(Rosenthal, 1999). Significantly these show that perception, interpretation and 
understanding is formed within the lived experience and social fabric of clinical 
practice, shaped by the shared cultural norms, attitudes and beliefs into which 
members are socialised (Paget, 2004). The way in which doctors give meaning to 
error has been linked to the inherent uncertainty of medical knowledge
 
(Fox, 1975; 
Rosenthal, 1995), the rituals of professional training and socialisation (Bosk, 1979), 
the collective strategies for normalising and rationalising wrong-doing (Mizrahi, 
1984) and for reinforcing the exclusivity and credibility of medical knowledge and 
professionalisms (Freidson, 1975; Rosenthal, 1995).  
 
The constructionist approach typically adopted by these studies highlights how shared 
culture(s) and knowledge(s) inform thinking about safety but also how these shared 
and patterned ways of thinking and communicating represent distinct, and sometimes 
competing discourses, which have significant implications for social order and 
control. For example, how one social group gives meaning to issues of safety has 
obvious ramifications for how safety is managed and this may be different from 
another social group. This constructionist perspective fundamentally questions the 
salience of proffered objective or universal taxonomies and definitions that are 
themselves the product of particular bodies of knowledge and cultural assumptions, 
including those ideas advanced by the Human Factors approach.  
 
Importantly, much of the existing socio-cultural research pre-dates the current patient 
safety agenda by many years and potentially lacks contemporary relevance given the 
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broader changes witnessed in health care management, quality improvement and now 
patient safety. Following the major scandals and inquiries into health care safety, for 
example the Bristol Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001) and the Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2005) 
and the subsequent emergence of the ‘patient safety’ agenda there is now much 
greater exposure to the type of ‘systems thinking’ advocated in policy. An additional 
issue with the existing studies is that they typically focus on how the socialisation 
processes and collegial norms of medicine serve to deal with the uncertainties of 
medical knowledge and protect professional status. There is therefore little 
contemporary evidence of whether medical thinking about the threats to patient safety 
actually portrays a ‘person-centred’ approach (Reason, 2000) or whether it resembles 
the type of ‘systems thinking’ promoted by the patient safety movement.  As 
suggested by Rosenthal (1999) in her review of the existing sociological literature 
shortly before the emergence of the UK ‘patient safety’ agenda, if the medical 
profession is to find new ways of improving its safety then it may “have to reach 
outside its own ranks, to other experts, who have studied human error in other fields” 
(p152).  
 
It is exactly this process of reaching out, or the extent to which other ideas have 
reached into medicine, that I want to consider in this paper. Specifically, the aim of 
the paper is to understand whether the idea of ‘systems thinking’, as promoted by the 
patient safety movement, is penetrating the culture and epistemology of frontline 
medical doctors. I elaborate this aim along three lines of enquiry, first, to what extent 
do doctors think about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety; second, where does 
this type of ‘systems thinking’ originate or on what is it based, with specific 
consideration for the influence of ‘systems thinking’ as promoted by the patient safety 
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movement; and third, to consider the implications of  doctors’ thinking about ‘the 
system’ as a threat to patient safety for medical professionalism and the ongoing 
implementation of the ‘patient safety’ reforms, especially medical participation in 
incident reporting and the extent of cultural change. These questions have significant 
implications for the success of the NRLS, culture change and securing medical 
participation in incident reporting.  
 
 
Methods 
 
The findings were gathered from an ethnographic study of one hospital’s experiences 
of implementing the ‘patient safety’ reforms, undertaken between 2000 and 2003. The 
setting of the research was a single medium-sized NHS District General Hospital in 
the English Midlands, which was selected on the basis of its generality in regard to 
other acute NHS hospitals. This paper is primarily based on the findings of in-depth, 
face-to-face interviews carried out with 30 specialist (consultant grade) physicians. 
The participants were selected from two samples. Initially, five doctors were selected 
from the management level of the hospital based upon their leadership roles and 
responsibilities within the areas of clinical risk, regulation and safety; this included 
the Medical Director, the Director of Clinical Audit, the Clinical Manager of Infection 
Control, the Clinical Manager for Medical Devices and a clinical representative for 
Education and Research. A further 25 specialist doctors were sampled from five 
medical departments: acute medicine, anaesthesia, obstetrics, rehabilitation and 
surgery, including the Clinical Director for each department. The interviews lasted 
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between 40 minutes and two hours in length with an average of one hour and ten 
minutes.  
 
Given the sensitive nature of the subject, i.e. medical error, and also the prevailing 
policy significance for the subject, ethical approval was sought from the 
organisation’s Research Governance Committee and Management Committee. Ethical 
issues were also addressed in writing with the hospital and the Medical Director to 
protect the anonymity and confidentiality of participants. Individual participants were 
informed of these ethical considerations and the confidential handling of data before 
acquiring their consent and participation. 
 
The conversational-style, semi-structured interviews (Burgess, 1991) were guided by 
a thematic guide that addressed a number of topics in accordance with the wider 
objectives of the ethnographic study, including questions related to how doctors made 
sense and responded to the threats to patient safety experienced in their work, and to 
investigate whether this thinking was informed by and commensurate with the kind of 
‘systems thinking’ promoted by the patient safety movement. The interview guide and 
approach was sufficiently flexible and open to enable participants to talk freely in 
their own language and terms, giving the doctors the opportunity to put forward and 
develop narrative accounts of their work, descriptions of what they saw as unsafe 
patient care and to elaborate explanatory models of how these events were brought 
about. All interviews were electronically recorded and transcribed verbatim before 
being imported into the computer package Atlas ti for the purposes of analysis. 
Analysis took place concurrently with data collection broadly following the principles 
of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000) whereby emergent themes and concepts were 
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elaborated and clarified through subsequent research activities, and through the 
processes of coding and thematic categorisation the findings were comparatively 
analysed for their internal consistency and conceptual relationships to address the 
research objectives and aims of the paper. 
 
It is important to consider the limitations of the study’s ambitions and design. Firstly, 
I do not intend this research to substantially develop or refute existing research in this 
area. The likes of Bosk
 
(1979) and Rosenthal
 
(1995) have thoroughly explored the 
professional socialisation processes that surround medical performance and error, 
although long before the current policy context. It is my intention therefore to 
empirically develop these findings within the current period of NHS reform. 
Secondly, I recognise that the sample size and also the selection of only one hospital 
may risk showing only the views of those working within one organisational setting 
and as such may not reflect the medical profession more generally. Whilst it is 
important to acknowledge this fact, it is also worthwhile recognising that the pre-
existing works in this area provide a reference point on which to support analysis, 
whilst the case study methodology succeeds in providing depth and validity to the 
data. Moreover, additional work reported by the author has substantiated the wider 
themes identified within this paper. 
 
The findings 
 
Initially, it is worth briefly considering the general manner in which doctors talked 
about the threats to patient safety. A common finding related to the apparent difficulty 
and complexity with which doctors articulated those aspects of their work associated 
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with notions of error, risk and patient harm. This may be indicative of the sensitivity 
of the subject matter, especially the associations with error and wrong-doing, and also 
the difficulty for frontline staff to explain factors beyond their immediate work 
setting. Moreover, the data often revealed multiple, divergent and some times 
contradictory lines of reasoning for why patient safety could be compromised, whilst 
relatively small sections of dialogue would raise a number of significant themes 
associated with how doctors make sense of the threats to patient safety in their work, 
including assumptions about causality, attitudes towards responsibility and blame, the 
meaning of professionalism, the role of management, the bureaucratized nature of 
health service, and the preferred models of quality improvement. For example, the 
assertion by one participant that “well, that’s not my fault it’s a system error” 
(Participant 23) reveals important findings about causality and the distinction between 
individual and system responsibility, it also highlights some appreciation for systems 
thinking, whilst indicating a particular perspective about the wider culture of blame 
and fault-finding within the NHS. These narratives and themes revealed much about 
how doctors gave meaning to the threats to patient safety, but in line with the aims of 
this paper, I asked three interrelated questions of the data: first, to what extent do 
doctors think about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety; second, where does this 
type of ‘systems thinking’ originate or on what is it based, with specific consideration 
for the influence of ‘systems thinking’ as promoted by the patient safety movement; 
and finally what are the implications of systems thinking for the profession and the 
implementation of policy. 
 
Do doctors think about the ‘system’ as a threat to patient safety? 
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A major finding from the interviews related to the way in which doctors would 
attempt to explain and account for the threats to patient safety experienced in their 
work. In the early exchanges of each interview the participants would typically talk 
about the threats located within the distinct stages of medical involvement in patient 
care, often using terms related to diagnosis or decision-making before moving on to 
consider treatment or intervention, such as, prescribing drugs or surgical technique. 
This would often involve a description of the uncertainty and difficulties of making a 
diagnosis or providing a treatment, highlighting the inherent uncertainty of medical 
practice (Paget, 2004; Rosenthal, 1995). Here the detailed language, jargon and 
explanations offered by doctors appeared highly individualistic and ‘technical’, 
resembling classifications and taxonomies proposed by other researchers (Tamuz, et 
al. 2004). My first impression of the data was that doctors did indeed follow, to some 
extent, a ‘person centred’ approach. However, what often followed was the attempt by 
participants to further explore the reasons why patient safety could be compromised 
an threatened by looking both inwards, towards the limits of medical knowledge and 
ability, and also outwards, to the wider context within which care is delivered. 
Through following this line of reasoning it appeared that this line of medical thinking 
was characterised by a ‘search for causality’, which eventually led participants to 
move beyond narrow technical descriptions to seek out wider systemic factors. This 
illustrated a significant shift in medical thinking about the threats to patient safety and 
it was at this stage that the ‘system’ began to feature as a prominent cause of 
individual error and, more generally, as a threat to patient safety. 
 
“I think that you can work it from the bottom upward and almost all adverse 
incidents are related to failures at multiple levels.” (Participant 19) 
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“[There] are people not thinking what they do and making a mistake. There 
are machine and equipment failures and things do go wrong. And then I 
suppose there are ones where it’s a sort of system failure and maybe several 
things have happened all at the same time.” (Participant 5) 
 
When talking about the ‘system’ doctors seemed to describe its character in two ways. 
The first was as an impersonal structural force that framed or structured care 
provision, such as staff shortages, resource limitations or winter pressures. The second 
related to the activities of individuals or groups, often face-less and name-less, 
working elsewhere within the hospital who somehow undermined the desired or 
expected level of clinical care, for example, patient notes had been lost, test results 
were not delivered on time, resources were not made available by managers. In the 
first instances doctors seem to unable to locate the exact causal factors, often referring 
instead to the ubiquitous, endemic and structural “pressures” of the NHS, whilst in the 
second instance doctors would identify a specific organisational role, function or duty 
with the wider organisation of care that had not been appropriately fulfilled or 
completed. Bringing these two themes together, the way in which doctors made sense 
and used terms such as ‘the system’ typically relate to the wider organisation and 
management of services at locations and levels removed from front-line clinical 
practice. 
 
“You must know the NHS [laughter]… there are so many things that go 
wrong, patient notes going missing, test results delayed, beds not available, 
my God it rarely work like I think maybe it should.” (Participant 16) 
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“There are many things that make it difficult for us to provide the service that 
we want to and a lot of the time it comes down to the management of the 
system.” (Participant 24) 
 
What participants understood as ‘the system’, together with its influence on patient 
care, was typically expressed with reference to the specialist areas of medical 
practice; where, for example, surgeons and anaesthetists highlighted the 
organisational problems of the operating department, and physicians working in acute 
medicine talked about the pressures of ward staff or bed availability.  
 
“Of course quite often these aren’t technical type errors, they are system, 
organisational errors…patient brought in too late, not properly assessed, 
brought down to theatre without being fully prepared.” (Participant 19: 
Anaesthetist) 
 
“In the middle of winter and a flu epidemic, we are still going to get patients 
admitted with respiratory disorders sent to wards that are completely 
unsuitable… every time there is a ward move there is a communication 
problem or could be, everybody does their best but it can lead to all sorts of 
delays and it can lead to mistakes eventually.” (Participant 20: Gerontologists) 
 
The impact of ‘the system’ on patient care was also articulated in two ways. The first 
was as a contextual and indirect influence that made the delivery and management of 
care sub-optimal in general, for example a lack of available beds or equipment, which 
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did not directly impinge upon medical performance and technical competence, but 
framed the wider environment for care provision experienced by many groups of 
staff. The second, and perhaps a more profound influence, was what doctors saw as 
the direct impact upon medical practice, where ‘the system’ compromised the quality 
and efficacy of medical decision-making or treatment, typically by requiring doctors 
to deviate from their normal routines, work sub-optimal conditions or through 
providing distractions or pressure. In this case ‘the system’ primarily threatened the 
safety of medical work but in doing so threatened the patient’s well-being. 
 
 “There are many pressures on what we do because of the way the service is 
organised and financed…these make it difficult for us to work to our best and 
sometimes it leads to patient harm.” (Participant 8) 
 
“Human error is always going to occur and it depends on how much pressure 
people are under, whether they have got time to make considered judgements 
or whether they are having to work so fast that they are having to make snap 
decisions which inevitably some of them go wrong. So again I would look at 
the system.” (Participant 15) 
 
Thinking about ‘the system’ was clearly something that doctors did readily stemming 
from a shared desire to identify ‘why’ safety could be compromised through 
explaining, in a backwards ‘step-wise’ fashion, the underlying causal relationship. 
This represents an ‘attributional process’ that seeks to locate or re-locate the sources 
of danger away from individual practice. I later develop this interpretation to suggest 
that this process helps to mitigate individual responsibility, providing a discursive 
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resource to legitimise professional competence. This ‘cause and effect’ understanding 
is not dissimilar from the practice of ‘root cause analysis’ promoted in policy (NPSA, 
2003) and on face value resembles the type of ‘system thinking’ promoted by the 
patient safety movement (Department of Health, 2000; Reason, 2000). Questions still 
remain, however, about the source of this type of thinking and whether it is shaped by 
current policies and reforms.  
 
 
Where does this ‘system thinking’ come from? 
Four common and shared discursively influences appeared to shape medical thinking 
about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety. First, the prevailing principles of 
‘patient safety’, as articulated in national policy; second, other media sources, such as 
professional journals, research reports and television programmes; thirdly, formal 
audits and reviews carried out within the hospital; and finally, knowledge and insight 
acquired through working in the NHS over a number of years. 
 
Only a small group of participants appeared to have a detailed understanding of the 
national ‘patient safety’ agenda and, significantly these all held medical-managerial 
responsibilities within the organisation, as either Clinical Directors in the medical 
departments or as medical representatives within hospital management, such as the 
Medical Director. In occupying these leadership and representational positions these 
individuals appeared to have greater exposure to policy, as policy guidelines and 
edicts were disseminated across the health service. Exposure to this information 
certainly seemed to be informing and shaping how these medical-managers talked 
about ‘the system’, with a many making direct reference to An Organisation with a 
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Memory
 
(Department of Health 2000), referring to it by the acronym “OWAM”, and 
using the language of policy, such as the ‘Swiss Cheese model’ and ‘root cause 
analysis’. In general, these participants regarded the patient safety agenda positively 
and were encouraged by new attempts at organisational learning. 
 
“Root cause analysis is standard stuff in industry and other places, you know 
we shouldn’t be reinventing the wheel just for the NHS” (Participant 11: 
Medical Director) 
 
“Maybe several things have happened, each one pretty small but they just 
happen to happen all at the same time and contributed to something more 
important, which is the Swiss Cheese theory and that sort of thing.” 
(Participant 5: Director of Clinical Audit) 
 
This is not to say that those participants without medical-managerial responsibilities 
were oblivious to the ‘patient safety’ agenda but for these other doctors their 
understanding of policy and ‘systems thinking’ was typically informed by other 
sources, such as professional publications, television documentaries or high-profile 
media ‘scandals’. In many cases these other influences corresponded with, endorsed 
or provided commentaries to the new policy agenda, for example the Channel Four 
documentary Why Doctors make Mistakes (Moore, 2000) and the special themed 
edition of the British Medical Journal titled “Reducing error: improving safety”
 
(March 2000). These did much to reinforce and legitimise the type of reasoning 
followed by doctors, especially the ‘search for causality’, 
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 “Yes individual errors do occur there is no doubt about that and research has 
shown and popular television programmes about medical errors have shown 
that it is usually a systems error.” (Participant 7) 
 
“I have that issue of the BMJ with the aeroplane on the front, and I have been 
telling my colleagues about it and lending it out.” (Participant 14) 
 
Another influence on medical thinking about the threats to patient safety was 
information produced by internal reviews and investigations, such as Confidential 
Enquiries, Clinical Audit and the Morbidity and Mortality Committees. It was 
suggested by most participants that through participating in these collegial activities 
they had come to appreciate how the wider context of care can have a negative 
influence patient safety and medical practice. As such participation in these processes 
seemed to crystallise and substantiate a shared understanding of those factors that 
threaten both the quality of medical practice and patient safety. There was, however, 
little indication that these procedures were informed by or promoted current policies, 
but rather reflected the collegial and regulatory customs of medicine (Freidson, 1975; 
Rosenthal, 1995). 
 
“We audit our service and this has picked up some consistent problems that, 
when we have analysed them, we have found to be problems with how the 
service is managed not really clinical practice” (Participant 5) 
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“When we note that something is not right, somebody is asked to audit that 
straight away…[it] is a very well oiled system and a very tight system when 
things go wrong we just go and do things very quickly.” (Participant 24) 
 
Perhaps the most powerful, embedded and deeply felt influence on medical thinking, 
however, came from years of working within the NHS. This represented a tacit or 
‘taken for granted’ (Polanyi, 1966) understanding of how the organisation of services 
can undermine the quality of medical care. It was often difficult for participants to 
explicitly articulate how they knew about ‘the system’ and to explain what evidence 
they had of its causal powers, yet it was apparent in the way doctors talked about their 
work, their hospital and the NHS in general that they shared an understanding of how 
services could be dis-organised. This implicit and tacit knowledge can be seen in 
many of the quotations presented above where participants talked, almost as a matter 
of fact and with some humour, about the organisational pressures on their work.  
 
“I don’t know…I guess you just know…after spending 15 years working here 
I’ve got to know how the place works and sometimes doesn’t.” (Participant 
16) 
 
It can be speculated that this knowledge is acquired and tacitly held through first hand 
clinical experience. Through the processes of medical training, specialisation and 
daily practice doctors not only learn and develop invaluable technical knowledge and 
expertise, but also implicit and ‘taken for granted’ knowledge of the many influences 
and pressures found in clinical practice, from the demands of teamwork to resource 
limitations. Furthermore, it can be argued that the more experienced and socialised a 
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doctor becomes within the organisation of health care, the more these pressures are 
perhaps accepted, taken for granted and implicit understood as ‘par for the course’ as 
they learn to work within ‘the system’. Later I develop this interpretation to suggest 
that this tacit understanding and learning to work with the system has wider 
implications for medical professionalism.  
 
Although a number of participants were clearly aware of the national policy agenda 
and were appreciative of the Human Factors approach, ‘root cause analysis’ and 
‘systems thinking’, for the majority of doctors it was the tacit or taken for granted 
understanding of service organisation, resource limitations, (mis-) management or the 
competing priorities of national policy that seemed to have the most pervasive 
influence on medical thinking about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety. 
Although difficult to articulate and express, this further illustrates its deep cultural and 
discursive significance to medical practice and thinking.  Importantly, this knowledge 
is acquired through years of first hand experience (Paget, 2004) and was embedded 
within medical thinking long before the current policy context and promotion of ‘root 
cause analysis’. As such it can be surmised that whilst doctors’ thinking about the 
threats to patient safety is indeed indicative of ‘system thinking’ it is not informed by 
the prevailing ideas promoted by the patient safety movement.  
 
 
The implications of ‘systems thinking’ 
My next concern was to understand the implications of the doctors’ type of ‘systems 
thinking’, as opposed to the policy approach, for both medical professionalism and the 
ongoing implementation of the patient safety reforms. Like those sociological works 
discussed above I conceive medical thinking as a shared and communicated way of 
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perceiving, interpreting and responding to safety concerns that is forged from within 
medical culture and knowledge, having important consequences for maintaining 
professional status whilst also impinging upon the success of reform.  
 
The professional implications build on Mizrahi’s (1984) concept of ‘discounting’ 
where he shows how trainee doctors blame other factors for error, including the 
system, in an effort to mitigate or ‘discount’ responsibility. Elaborating this idea, I 
found that doctors identify ‘the system’ as a threat to safety through making an 
interpretative causal link between ‘the system’, ‘individual practice’ and ‘patient 
safety’. This can be seen in my earlier discussion of the doctors’ ‘search for causality’ 
where, for example, one participant suggested that “you can work it from the bottom 
upward and almost all adverse incidents are related to failures at multiple levels” 
(Participant 19) or similarly where another talked about the impact of ‘winter 
pressures’. It can be argued that this way of thinking serves to relocate the source of 
danger or “failure” to other “pressures” thereby deflecting questions of professional 
competence and protecting against criticism, self-doubt and a loss of credibility.  As 
one surgeon stated when describing an example of unsafe care, “well, that’s not my 
fault, it’s a system error” (Participant 23). Systems thinking can therefore be invoked 
to protect against professional blame and responsibility when patient care is 
threatened or substandard. 
 
“We all make mistakes, there but for the Grace of God…but a lot the problems 
are not down to what we do, they are the result of other things going on with 
the organisation” (Participant 27) 
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However, this type of ‘systems thinking’ could be seen as too easily removing 
professional accountability. The safety management literature highlights the problem 
of ‘learned helplessness’, whereby an excessive focus on latent factors leads to the 
individual being seen as a passive victim with little responsibility, even when there 
may be an issue of individual responsibility or complicity. As such the prevailing 
logic of policy demands analysis of the interaction between the active and latent 
factors, and could inadvertently question the ethos of a ‘no blame culture’ endorsing 
instead a ‘low blame’ or a ‘just blame’ culture (NPSA 2003). However, the doctors’ 
thinking about the threats to patient safety seemed to reflect more than just a desire to 
shift blame, revealing something more significant about the nature of medical 
socialisation. As indicated above, through the experiences of care provision doctors 
seem to acquire a tacit understanding of, what were often termed, the “pressures” of 
‘the system’. An anticipated implication for medical professionalism is that it is 
expected that newcomers to the service must rapidly learn to appreciate and work 
with these factors in order to provide patient care, in other words learning to cope 
with the systems and still provide clinical care.  
 
“These problems arise day-in, day-out, I suppose what is important is learning 
how to cope with them.” (Participant 8) 
 
“…members of the firm need to realise how we work and how the service is 
organised…the house officers are on a steep learning curve and a part [of that] 
being gaining through clinical experience but also getting to grips with the 
service” (Participant 16) 
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Rather than ‘learned helplessness’ it could be argued, therefore, that a feature of 
medical socialisation and culture could be termed ‘learned tolerance’. This sense of 
coping and tolerance was further illustrated in the way doctors would respond to the 
threats to patient safety. The interviews revealed that the doctors placed primary 
importance on dealing with the immediate clinical danger, for example, blood loss or 
a miscalculation of dose, which would normally involve some instant technical 
intervention. Despite recognising that in many cases such dangers were brought about 
by other factors, such as poor communication or time pressures, there was little 
indication that the participants would at some later time seek to make broader or more 
systemic changes. 
 
“We never seem to have enough laryngeal masks of the right size… obviously 
you do the best you can…get one from another theatre, try and make do with 
some thing that is slightly out, otherwise the patient can’t be intubated and 
anaesthetised” (Participant 20) 
 
“Obviously the important issue is to treat the patient as best you can, I can’t 
make changes to the way the hospital runs…I might have a word with our 
Clinical Director and raise it in a meeting. I once wrote a letter to the Medical 
Director, but that did nothing” (Participant 15) 
 
The emphasis therefore appeared to be on accommodating, coping and tolerating with 
the threats presented by ‘the system’ in order to delivery effective and safe patient 
care. This has further implication for the implementation and success of the patient 
safety reforms, especially incident reporting. Given that doctors appeared to tolerate 
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the systemic threats, whilst focussing their efforts on the immediate remedial 
intervention, there appeared to be little recognition of the role played by incident 
reporting. Specifically, it was argued that there was little relevance in incident 
reporting because the threats presented by the system were almost inevitable, and 
emphasis was placed on learning to cope, rather than changing the system.  
 
“What good does [reporting] do? It’s not like it could ever make us error-free” 
(Participant 5) 
 
“These problems are so ingrained in how the service is organised…there have 
been a number of attempts to sort them out, and incident reporting is the new 
one, but it will never really be able to deal with the underlying problems” 
 
It could be argued therefore that whilst doctors’ thinking about the threats to patient 
safety certainly illustrates a form of ‘systems thinking’, when responding to these 
threats the doctors maintained a narrow, technical or ‘person-centred’ perspective. 
These may be a consequence of medical training whereby learning to work with or 
cope with the system is a feature of medical socialisation; it may also indicate the 
over-riding importance of treating the presenting (current) patient effectively and 
safely rather than seeking to modify the wider management of services, which 
perhaps reveals a division of responsibility between service managers and service 
providers; or alternatively it may suggest that past efforts to improve the organisation 
of service have been unsuccessful thereby discouraging participation in the NRLS. 
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When considered alongside accounts of the closed, collegial and exclusive domains of 
professional regulation (Kennedy, 2001; Rosenthal, 1995), the capacity to ‘discount’ 
individual error by invoking ‘the system’, together with the doctors’ tendency to work 
with and tolerate ‘the system’ and the apparent lack of support for incident reporting 
(see also Vincent et al, 1999; Waring 2005a) leads to the possibility that some threats 
to safety, whether individual or systemic in nature, may consistently escape scrutiny.  
This also raises serious questions about the extent to which cultural change and the 
creation of a ‘safety culture’ is being made (NPSA, 2003), given that despite openly 
acknowledging the causal role played by ‘the system’, doctors maintain an 
individualised and ‘person-centred’ approach for responding to these threats. 
 
Although medical thinking about ‘the system’ clearly resembles the ideas promoted 
by the patient safety movement, it is important to consider that they represent 
divergent discourses, which have different preferences for the control or management 
of safety. Nevertheless, the clear willingness of doctors to think in terms of ‘the 
system’ is promising for policy and suggests that the need to instil a completely new 
way of thinking may be unnecessary. The future of ‘patient safety’ may be enhanced 
through better articulating the similarities between medical thinking and the principles 
of policy, showing that it is not necessarily something radical, managerial or non-
medical; bringing to the two discourse of safety together around common themes and 
objectives. This may involve persuading doctors to be ‘mindful’ (Reason, 1997) of the 
threats to patient safety. This may require a language that is less managerial in style 
and more grounded in the real experiences of patient care. This is not to say, however, 
that advances made in this area will necessarily overcome the barriers to incident 
reporting that exist in other areas of medical practice and culture. 
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Conclusions 
  
It has been said that the health service is too often characterised by a ‘person-centred’ 
approach to safety that fosters a ‘blame culture’ amongst professionals and inhibits 
organisational learning (Department of Health, 2000; Reason, 2000). The creation of a 
‘safety culture’ is therefore central to the success of the patient safety movement, with 
‘systems thinking’ being promoted to encourage ‘mind fullness’, counter the fear of 
blame, further the virtues of openness and learning, and encourag staff participation in 
the NRLS. In this paper I have been concerned to appreciate whether the idea of 
‘systems thinking’ as promoted by policy has penetrated medical culture and doctors’ 
thinking about the threats to patient safety. Referring back to Rosenthal’s (1999) 
suggestion, this paper has sought to appreciate if medicine is reaching out or being 
reached by experts in other fields to change its way of thinking.  
 
Although much has been written about how doctors make sense of mistakes, this work 
pre-dates the current patient safety agenda. Building on these studies, my findings 
indicate that contemporary medical thinking is characterised by a ‘search for 
causality’ that commonly identifies ‘the system’ as an underlying threat to patient 
safety. This questions the alleged prevalence of a ‘person-centred’ approach, and 
suggests that medical thinking outwardly resembles the type of ‘systems thinking’ 
advocated in policy.  Doctors’ thinking about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety 
is not, however, strongly informed by policy, being instead acquired through the first-
hand experience of working within the health service, whereby doctors come to 
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implicitly appreciate the pressures and limitations inherent with the organisation of 
the NHS. Ultimately, medical thinking is not commensurate with the discourse of 
safety advocated in health policy, representing instead a distinct social discourse that 
competes to define and control the threats to patient safety. Significantly, it can be 
seen as constituting a resource for rationalising or mitigating issues of individual 
wrongdoing (Mizrahi, 1984), whilst the main implication for policy relates to the 
doctors’ engagement with the NRLS, with doctors appearing to accommodate and 
work-with the threats presented by the system, rather than participating in incident 
reporting.  This questions the extent to which cultural change within the NHS is being 
made as medical thinking and behaviour remains distinct from the ambitions of 
policy, with doctors’ thinking remaining strongly influenced by the socialisation 
processes and longstanding culture of medicine (Bosk, 1979; Rosenthal, 1995).  In 
conclusions, it seems therefore that doctors are neither reaching out to nor being 
reached by the experts from other fields and the idea of systems thinking as promoted 
by the patient safety movement is not significantly penetrating frontline medical staff.  
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